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Abstract
According to Directive 2009/28/EC overall share of RES in EU energy con-
sumption must be 20% and 10% in transport consumption. The 2020 target
for Germany is 18% and for the Czech Republic is 13%. The major finan-
cial supporting schemes in the Czech Republic and Germany include feed-in
tariffs and green bonuses. Likewise, we propose some ways to resolve some
flaws of RES, such as intermittency character of RES, free-rider problem in
case of quota obligations scheme etc. Though European Commission approved
the shift from FIT scheme towards auction scheme, we analyse the dependence
between FITs and installed capacities of RES. As a result of this analysis we
obtained optimum intervals of FITs for some types of RES.
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Proposed topic Growth opportunities and financing of renewable energy
in Germany and Czech Republic
Topic characteristics European Commission created the Renewable energy
directive that requires all EU countries to generate 20 percent of energy from
renewable sources by 2020 and 10 percent of their transport fuels come from
renewable sources by 2020.
There are two major policies for promoting renewable energy generation in
the EU: feed-in-tariffs (FITs) and quota obligations. Naturally, such policies
create distortions in the energy market. Furthermore, in April, 2014 European
Commission approved the removal of all FIT support mechanisms for RES
effective from 2017 and shift towards auction mechanism. We will examine
how size of FITs induce investors to install capacities of RES in the Czech
Republic and Germany based on empirical data. And will try to find intervals
for optimum FITs.
Hypotheses At this early stage of my research, there are several questions,
which could be potentially answered in the thesis. First, we want to determine
the relation between greenhouse gas abatement and RES share in heating and
cooling, electricity and transport. Secondly, we want to find intervals for feed-in
tariffs at which annual installed capacities are maximized.
Methodology We will run three regressions where dependent variables will
be GHG abatement by the means of RES-H/C, RES-E and RES-T and inde-
pendent variables will be share of RES-H/C, RES-E and RES-T respectively.
Likewise, we will run various regressions on annual installed capacities where
feed-in tariffs and/or their polynomials will act as independent variables.




3. Overview of existing Germany and Czech renewable energy policies
4. Methodology and model
5. Empirical data analysis
6. Outcome
7. Conclusion
In the first part of the thesis, we will review existing prominent policies
of promotion renewable energy sources in the Czech Republic and Germany.
Then, we will review critique of policies in these countries. After that, we will
run various regressions and define the optimum intervals for FITs. Finally, we
will summarize the outcomes of the regressions and conclude.
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On April 23, 2009 European Commission published so-called the Renewables
Directive, official title – Directive 2009/28/EC. This directive mandated all
the Member States to achieve certain level of renewable energy sources in final
consumption by 2020. Overall share of RES in EU energy consumption must
be 20% and 10% in transport consumption. The 2020 target for Germany is
18% and for the Czech Republic is 13%.
The major financial supporting schemes in the Czech Republic and Ger-
many include feed-in tariffs and green bonuses, these schemes are reviewed in
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1. Feed-in tariff scheme is widely criticised because of its
excessive costs, this critique is reviewed in section 3.1. As a result of this and
due to other reasons on April 9, 2014 European Commission approved the shift
from all FIT support mechanisms towards auction scheme for RES effective
from 2017.
In Chapter 2, we summarize support schemes and targets in Germany and
the Czech Republic by reviewing National Renewable Energy Action Plans and
briefly review other existing policies for promotion of RES. Chapter 3 reviews
critique of RES in literature and also includes the analysis of greenhouse gas
emissions abatement by the means of RES. Chapter 4 describes the model we
use and the outcomes of the model. Finally, we conclude.
Analysis of greenhouse gas emissions abatement is done with the use of
econometric tools. We run the regressions of GHG abatement by the means of
RES-E, RES-H/C and RES-T on RES-E, RES-H/C and RES-T share in final
gross consumption respectively. In addition, we estimate GHG abatement for
2020.
The model in Chapter 4 is going to analyse how FITs and installed capacities
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of RES are correlated. Therefore, we will try to find the optimum intervals of
FITs for each type of RES by analysis of empirical data. We are not analysing
actual generation of energy by RES, since it is dependent on weather conditions
and etc. i.e. factors which are hardly can be controlled. Likewise, we are not
analysing the results of auctions already held in Germany, since there is no
enough data in order to draw some conclusions, nonetheless some summary
about this scheme is provided in Section 2.3. Thereby, the optimum intervals we
found can be used until 2017, unless European Commission will not postpone
the removal of FIT support mechanisms. Moreover, FITs inside the optimal
intervals do not minimise overall costs of supporting RES, they are indicating
FITs values at which installed capacities of RES can be maximised.
Chapter 2
Overview of existing policies
2.1 German National Renewable Energy Action
Plan
The latest issue of German National Renewable Action Plan (hereinafter Ger-
man NREAP) was published in July 2010.
RES-E generation increased fivefold from 17 TWh in 1990 to 93 TWh in
2009 (all numerical data in this section is taken from German NREAP, if not
stated otherwise). In addition, composition of RES-E changed dramatically, in
1990, 91% of RES-E was generated by hydropower, while in 2009 40% of RES-E
was generated by wind power, 33% by biomass and only 20% by hydropower.
RES-H/C generation increased from 32 TWh in 1990 to 115 TWh in 2009,
main portion generated by biomass.
As all NREAPs, the German one has its projections of gross final consump-
tion of energy until 2020.
Table 2.1: Expected gross final consumption of energy in Germany
in the areas of heating and cooling, electricity and trans-
port until 2020, taking into account the impact of energy
efficiency and energy saving measures 2015-2020 (ktoe)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Heating and cooling 103588 101581 99551 97449 95276 93139
Electricity 50588 50229 49799 49346 48844 48317
Transport 51279 50655 50034 49414 48857 48302
Gross final consumption 213122 210089 206984 203760 200463 197178
Source: National Renewable Energy Action Plan of Germany
We can see from the Table 2.1 that Germany will gradually decrease its
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gross final consumption. The biggest decline, decrease of 10%, is expected in
heating and cooling sector due to increased efficiency.
Directive 2009/28/EC sets the 2020 target level of renewable energy in gross
final energy consumption of 18% for Germany. Whereas, German NREAP
estimates that by 2020 share of RES in gross final energy consumption will
be 19.6%. In the electricity sector RES will account for 38.6%, in the heat-
ing/cooling sector RES will account for 15.5% and in the transport sector RES
will account for 13.2%. German NREAP has its estimated trajectories of re-
newable energy in aforementioned sectors. These estimations will be used as a
reference in the following assumptions and computations.
Table 2.2: Estimated trajectory of energy from renewable sources in
heating and cooling, electricity and transport 2015-2020 in
Germany
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
RES-H/C (%) 11.7 12.4 13.1 13.9 14.7 15.5
RES-E (%) 26.8 28.8 31.0 33.3 35.9 38.6
RES-T (%) 7.0 7.1 9.3 9.4 9.7 13.2
Overall RES share (%) 13.5 14.4 15.7 16.7 17.7 19.6
Source: National Renewable Energy Action Plan of Germany
There are a lot of policies and measures for promotion of renewable energy
mentioned and described in German NREAP, we will describe the ones con-
cerning feed-in tariffs and other financial support schemes. The full list of the
core measures can be found in Table 5 of German NREAP.
In Germany, there is a federal law, the Renewable Energies Heat Act (EE-
WarmeG), which requires all new buildings to cover heat energy needs of at
least 15% by solar thermal energy, 30% by biogas or 50% by liquid or solid
biomass, heat pumps or geothermal energy. However, no federal law exists
regarding use of RES in existing buildings. Nevertheless, such laws can be
implemented by federal states.
Major legislative instrument for promotion RES in Germany is the Renew-
able Energy Source Act (hereinafter EEG). It came in force on April 1, 2000.
The EEG includes many regulations regarding grid connections such as prior-
ity grid connection for producers of RES-E and compensation schemes such as
feed-in tariffs and etc.
In case of disputes between RES producers and grid operators, there is a
neutral body for resolving them – The Clearing House EEG. The costs regard-
ing a grid connection, optimization, expansion and development are borne by
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the grid operator. Some part of the costs is recovered by grid fees. Moreover,
producers of RES-E are not charged transmission and distribution tariffs.
2.1.1 Financial support schemes
There are different financial support schemes:
(a) Feed-in tariff – all RES-E plants with capacity up to 500 kW and in ac-
cordance with EEG can be entitled with FITs. Producers of RES-E are
guaranteed with FITs for 20 years, with exception of large hydropower
plants, they are guaranteed for 15 years, plus the year of putting into
operation. FITs are paid by grid operators, who are obliged to buy all
electricity from RES-E producer, to producers. However, these additional
costs are passed onto end customers via TSOs and DSOs and end cus-
tomers have them included in their bills. Feed in tariffs are technology
specific, they can be found in the Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: German feed-in tariffs as of 11.12.2014
Type of RES Feed-in tariff EURcent/kWh
Hydropower 3.50 - 12.52
Biomass 5.85 - 23.73 minus 0.2 per kWh
Biogas 5.83 - 27.73 minus 0.2 per kWh
Wind power plant
Onshore: 4.95 - 8.90 minus 0.4 per kWh
Offshore: 3.9 - 19.4 minus 0.4 per kWh
Geothermal power plant 25.2 minus 0.2 per kWh
Photovoltaic power plant
specific building-mounted systems: 11.49 - 13.15
minus 0.4 per kWh
other systems: 9.23 minus 0.4 per kWh
up to 10 kW: 12.59
up to 40 kW: 12.25
up to 500 kW: 10.95
up to 10 MW: 8.72
Source: RES LEGAL
There is a cap for PV plants of 52 000 MW which are entitled for
FITs. No caps for other technologies have been introduced. Additionally,
Germany has introduced degression rates, i.e. FITs will decrease annually
for some percentage thus inducing producers to reduce costs. Degression
rates can be found in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Degression rates for German FITs
Type of RES Degression rate
Hydropower 0.5% every year
Biomass
0.5% every 3 months and if biomass surpasses 100 MW
degression rate go up to 1.27%
Biogas
Landfill and sewage gas: 1.5%
Other: 0.5% every 3 months and if biogas
surpasses 100MW degression rate go up to 1.27%
Wind
Onshore: 0.4% every 3 months and if power surpasses
2600 MW degression rate go up to 1.2%. If power goes
below 2400 MW the degression rate decreases and in
extreme cases FITs even increased.
Offshore: until 1.1.2018 no degression rate imposed,
then degression rate will be between 0.5% and 1.0%
Geothermal 5% every year from 2018
Photovoltaic
0.5% every month if power surpasses 2600 MW
degression rate go up to 2.8%. If power goes below
2400 MW the degression rate decreases and in extreme
cases FITs even increased by up to 1.5%
Source: RES LEGAL
(b) The KfW1 Financing Initiative Energiewende – this scheme provides with
low-interest loans for investments in installations of RES-E in accordance
with EEG. The loan can cover up to 50% of the project and can be
between EUR 25 million and EUR 100 million. The loan is long-term
and interest period is up to 20 years, in addition, first 3 years can be
repayment-free. Interest rates depend on the situation on capital mar-
kets but are fixed for 10 years, for loans exceeding 10 years interest rates
are redefined. Energy supply companies cannot get loans under this pro-
gramme. Only companies with annual turnover between EUR 500 million
and EUR 4 billion are eligible for this programme.
(c) The KfW Programme Geothermal Exploration Risk – this programme is
eligible only for geothermal energy. It covers investments costs of drilling
activities, the loan can cover maximum 80% of the costs. There is a cap
of EUR 16 million per drilling. The loan is given for 10 years with first 2
repayment-free years.
(d) The KfW Programme offshore wind energy – this programme is eligible
1KfW is a German state-owned development bank, which provides financial aid for re-
newable energy projects
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only for companies that want to construct wind farms inside 12 nautical-
mile zone of the North and Baltic Sea. There are three different forms
of financing: (i) direct loans under financing by bank syndicates; (ii)
financing package combining a KfW on-lent through a bank loan and a
direct loan from KfW; (iii) in addition to (i) and (ii), a direct loan under
bank syndicates is granted covering unforeseen costs during construction
phase.The loans are long-term and interest period is 20 years with first 3
repayment-free years. Interest rate is redefined after 10 years.
(e) The KfW Renewable Energy Programme Premium – this programme is
eligible only for producers of electricity from geothermal energy. Loans
cover up to 80% of investment costs. Loans can be given for 5,10 or 20
years with first 1,2 and 3 repayment-free years respectively. Interest rates
are fixed for 10 years and then redefined if loan is for 20 years.
(f) The KfW Renewable Energy Programme-Standard – this programme is
eligible for investments in any RES technology. Loans can be given to
projects even if they are not to be constructed in Germany but close
to German borders and moreover even if project is done abroad but by
German company. Loan can cover up to 100% of investment costs, never-
theless there is a cap of EUR 25 million per project. The loan is long-term
and low-interest with fixed interest periods of 5 or 10 years including the
repayment-free period. Effective interest rates may vary between 1.31%
and 7.56% per annum. The fixed interest loan can be granted for 20 years
if economic and technical duration of investment is longer than 10 years.
(g) Market premium – all technologies of RES are entitled for market pre-
miums. Market premium is granted usually for 20 years plus the year of
putting into operation. Market premiums are paid by grid operators, who
are obliged to purchase all generated electricity. However, these costs,
identically as in FITs scheme, passed onto end customers and they have
these costs in their bills. The amount of market premium is calculated ev-
ery month by subtracting the monthly electricity value in EURcent/kWh
from the reference tariff (which can be found in Table 2.3). The scheme
is identical to FITs with only difference – plants with installed capacity
exceeding 500 kW are eligible for this scheme.
(h) Flexibility premium – only biogas plants that are put into operation be-
fore August 1, 2014 are eligible for this support. Subsidy is provided only
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for additional capacity for on-demand use. The amount of the subsidy
is EUR 130 per additionally installed kW per year for 10 years. The
subsidies will be provided until 1.350 MW of additional capacities will be
reached. The additional costs are borne by end customers.
(i) Flexibility surcharge – same plants eligible as for flexibility premium.
This subsidy can be combined with market premium or feed-in tariff.
Flexibility surcharge amounts for 40 euro per installed kW per year for
duration of eligibility of market premium or FIT. Additional costs are
borne by end customers.
It is stipulated in the EEG that electricity, which gets feed-in tariff, cannot
be marketed as ”green electricity”. Nonetheless, it is possible for producers of
RES-E to get simultaneously FITs and low-interest loans.
In 2009, the use of domestic renewable energy sources prevented 108 mil-
lion tons of CO2 equivalents of energy related greenhouse gas emissions. EUR
5.7 billion of energy imports were saved. The total turnover from renewable
energies was EUR 33.3 billion, EUR 17.6 billion in new construction and de-
velopment of installations for RES and EUR 15.7 billion in other renewable
energy plant operations.
Germany has 300 000 employees in renewable energy industry, this is 75%
higher than in 2004. Furthermore, Germany anticipates 400 000 people to be
employed in renewable energy sector by 2020. Also, 215 million tones of CO2
emissions to be prevented by 2020 through the use of RES.
2.2 Czech National Renewable Energy Action Plan
Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic published the latest issue
of Czech National Renewable Energy Action Plan (hereinafter Czech NREAP)
in August 2012.
As all NREAPs, the Czech one has its projections of gross final energy
consumption until 2020.
From the Table 2.5 it is seen that unlike Germany, Czech Republic does
not expect a decline in gross final energy consumption. Only a little decrease
is anticipated in heating and cooling sector.
Directive 2009/28/EC sets the 2020 target level of renewable energy in gross
final consumption of 13% for the Czech Republic. Whereas Czech NREAP
targets 14% of gross final consumption to come from renewable energy sources
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Table 2.5: Expected gross final energy consumption of the Czech Re-
public in heating and cooling, electricity and transport up
to 2020 taking into account the effects of energy efficiency
and energy saving measures 2015 - 2020 (ktoe)
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Heating and cooling 16 812 16 739 16 667 16 638 16 600 16 586
Electricity 6 328 6 425 6 520 6 616 6 712 6 810
Transport 6 436 6 453 6 470 6 453 6 437 6 407
Gross final consumption 29 576 29 617 29 657 29 708 29 748 29 803
Source: National Renewable Energy Action Plan of the Czech Republic
by 2020. Czech NREAP has its estimated trajectories of renewable energy in
heating and cooling, electricity and transport.
Table 2.6: Estimated trajectory of energy from renewable sources in
heating and cooling, electricity and transport 2015–2020
in the Czech Republic
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
RES-H/C (%) 13.6 14.0 14.5 14.8 15.2 15.5
RES-E (%) 12.8 13.0 13.2 13.4 13.5 13.5
RES-T (%) 7.1 7.7 8.3 9.6 10.2 10.8
Overall RES share (%) 12.0 12.4 12.8 13.3 13.7 14.0
Source: National Renewable Energy Action Plan of the Czech Republic
There are a lot of policies and measures for promotion of renewable energy
mentioned and described in Czech NREAP, we will only describe the ones re-
garding feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums (so called green bonuses). The full
list of all policies and measures for promotion of renewable energy mentioned
in Czech NREAP can be found in Table 5 of Czech NREAP.
It is highlighted that the Czech Republic has ”Complex legislation (one of
the most complex in the EU)” regarding authorization and other permissions
prior to the construction of renewable energy plants. The preparation and
implementation phase takes between 122 and 196 months.
According to the Act No. 165/2012 TSOs and DSOs are required to con-
nect producer of RES to the grid if producer requests and complies with the
connection conditions.
2.2.1 Financial support schemes
In the Czech republic there are three types of financial support for RES:
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(a) Investment support from subsidy schemes for the promotion of renewable
energy and heat production
(b) Feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums - this type will be discussed later
(c) Tax exemptions and tax refunds
Tax exemptions and tax refunds, pursuant to the Act No. 586/1992 on
income tax, are attributable to:
• Small water power plants up to the capacity of 1 MW,
• Wind power plants,
• Heat pumps,
• Solar installations,
• Installations generating and using biogas and woodgas,
• Biomass energy or heat generating installations,
• Installations generating biologically degradable substances as specified in
a special legal regulation.
Tax exemptions last for first five years of operation plus the year of putting
into operation.
Feed-in tariffs and green bonuses are part of so-called operational support.
These two schemes of support cannot be combined, however producers may
switch from one to another once a year.
The Energy Regulatory Office taking into account the industrial producer
price index recalculates feed-in tariffs annually. Feed-in tariffs are guaranteed
for a lifecycle of a renewable energy plant, which is usually 20 years.
Green bonuses are guaranteed only for one year, and then reassessment by
the Energy Regulatory Office is done.
The amount of green bonuses is determined by the Energy Regulatory Office
basing on the market price of electricity. Producers can sell the generated
electricity to the market and get a green bonus, likewise, producers can consume
the generated electricity and get a green bonus for consumption of RES-E. From
this perspective, green bonuses scheme is hedging producers from market prices
fluctuations, since a green bonus is a markup to a market price of electricity.
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Under feed-in tariff scheme, producers of RES-E can sell generated elec-
tricity to the mandatory purchaser who is obliged to pay the feed-in tariff and
then the market operator pays the difference between the feed-in tariff and the
market electricity price. In case of green bonuses, the market operator pays
them to producers of RES-E.
There is a state subsidy to cover the costs of market operators associated
with feed-in tariffs. This subsidy covers all support costs of heat and the
remaining part covers support costs of electricity. If not all support costs of
electricity are covered by the subsidy, then they are borne by end customers.
The Energy Regulatory Office determines the nationwide uniform fee for end
customers and the amount of the subsidy is determined by Ministry of Industry
and Trade.
For feed-in tariffs not to be volatile, it is restricted to lower them more than
by 5% per year and increase them more than by 15%. In addition, there is a
cap on the amount of support for all forms of 4500 CZK per MWh.
Feed-in tariffs and green bonuses are technology-specific. Furthermore, feed-
in tariffs and green bonuses are different for plants with different vintage (the
year of putting into operation). Tariffs in the Table 2.7 are excluding VAT.
Table 2.7: Czech feed-in tariffs and green bonuses for 2014















up to 5 kW: 11.10
up to 30 kW: 9.00
up to 5 kW: 8.9
up to 30 kW: 6.8
Source: RES LEGAL
In the feed-in tariff scheme there is a cap on installed capacity, the following
plants are entitled to the feed-in tariffs
• Photovoltaic power plants up to 30 kWp2,
2kilowatt peak
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• RES other than photovoltaic power plants up to 100 kW,
• Wind power plants up to 10 MW.
In the green bonuses scheme there are no caps on installed capacity.
As a result of these support schemes prices for end customers increase, since
additional costs of promotion of RES are borne by them.
Nonetheless, producers of RES-E cannot combine feed-in tariffs and green
bonuses, but they can get different types of financial support simultaneously,
e.g. obtain green bonuses and income tax exemptions. Also, producers of
RES-E and RES-H/C get loans with lower interest rates.
As of renewable sources in heating and cooling, there are the following
support schemes:
(a) Investment support from the European Union Structural Funds (Oper-
ational Programmes in Environment, Business and Innovation and the
2007–2013 Rural Development Plan),
(b) Exemption from property tax (pursuant to Regulation No. 12/1993),
(c) Direct operational support of generation of heat from RES by means of
annual green bonuses resulting from Act No. 165/2012,
(d) Indirect support by means of a support of RES-H/C
2.3 Other existing policies
Quota obligations is a quantity based approach, whereas feed-in tariff scheme
is a price based approach. In quota scheme, some fixed amount of sold elec-
tricity in the market has to be generated from RES. The amount of electricity
from RES is determined for the whole state. After that, the amount is allocated
among all operators. Thus, operators have to buy so-called green certificates or
buy energy directly from producers of RES. Certificates are issued by RES-E
generator and then RES-E producers can sell electricity at market prices plus
separately sell green certificates. If produced electricity is sold without green
certificate, it cannot be accounted by the buyer as green energy. So even if in
fact electricity is generated from RES, it is not counted as green without the
certificate, this fact may cause a free-rider problem, which will be discussed
later.
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Tradable certificates system induces suppliers of electricity invest more effi-
ciently. For example, there is a fixed amount of RES-E to be sold q for supplier
A and B, but supplier A is unable to generate required amount q by itself, it
generates amount a, whereas supplier B can generate more than q, it generates
amount b. So we have a < q < b. With existing tradable certificates market,
supplier B can sell certificates for surplus electricity (= b − q) and supplier A
can buy certificates for missing amount of RES-E (= q − a).
Therefore, suppliers choose by themselves whether to invest into RES-E
installations or buy certificates in the market. Certificates system also induces
technological innovation and competition between RES-E producers. Under
quota system, investors will be more careful about their investments, i.e. they
will examine the site of installation more as well as the selection of technology
to use. So no PV installations will be made in areas where sun barely shines and
so forth. However, this may hinder development of immature but promising
technologies.
Under certificate system, free-rider problem may occur. For example, there
are two suppliers N and S in the country. Supplier N operates in the north-
ern region of the country and supplier S in the southern region. Supplier N
produces energy solely from RES and supplier S uses only fossil fuels. Thus,
supplier S meets quota obligation entirely by buying certificates from supplier
N. Customers of supplier S will have to cover additional costs associated with
purchase of these certificates, whereas customers of supplier N will not have
these additional costs. Nonetheless, customers of supplier N will enjoy cleaner
air and other benefits associated with RES at the expense of customers of sup-
plier S. While customers of supplier S will not enjoy same (if any) portion of
benefits associated with RES, since located in another region. This problem
can be resolved by introducing a cap on purchasing of certificates from other
regions. However, this can impede the liquidity of tradable certificates market.
Under such system, prices for certificates will be determined by the market
itself. In order to avoid extreme prices price ceiling and price floor can be
defined. Furthermore, in order to decrease volatility of certificate prices market
for futures can be created. Menanteau et al. (2003) suggests to redistribute
money collected from ones who was unable to meet the quota by reverse bidding
system to producers-sellers of RES-E.
Renewable energy auctions is a hybrid of quantity-based and price-based
approaches. Governments set the target of RES-E and producers of RES-E
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or project developers act as bidders. Thus, bidders bid a price per unit of
electricity at which they will generate it. Then government assesses the bids
on the basis of price and other criteria and signs a power purchasing agreement
with the winner of the auction.
Auction scheme allows governments to design an auction according to their
needs, thus governments can have more control over the sector and its devel-
opment. Also, with the use of well-designed auctions the real price will be
discovered. Since, it is a competitive process and bidders are induced not to
inflate prices for the product, so they bid the real prices or at least close to
real. Thus, excessive costs associated with support of RES should decrease,
since more competition will induce producers to reduce their costs.
First auctions held in Germany revealed that FITs for PV plants are lower
than actual costs faced by producers. The auction took place in April 2015 and
the total capacity to be auctioned was 156.97 MW3 of solar PV. Average price
of successful bids was 91.7 EUR/MWh4 which is higher than FIT at that time
by 1.5 EUR/MWh. This fact may explain a sharp decline of PV installations
in Germany, from about 7604 MW in 2012 to about 3304 MW in 2013 and
2006 MW in 2014.
In addition, auction scheme is more precise about quantities to be produced
than price-based approaches, since the amount of produced RES-E is stipulated
in the contract, and more precise about prices than quantity-based approaches,
since the contract also stipulates the prices. Consequently, auction scheme
exclude some flaws of price and quantity based approaches.
However, auction scheme will work best if competitive environment is as-
sured, so small players should not be discouraged to participate. Consequently,
transaction costs must be minimised. Also, the process must be as transparent
as possible in order to exclude room for corruption. A very good guide for
designing renewable energy auctions was published by IRENA and CEM in
2015, titled: ”Renewable Energy Auctions – A Guide to Design.”
This policy is gaining acceptance worldwide, with less than 10 countries with
such mechanism in 2005 to some 60 countries in early 2015. In 2014, European
Commission released guidelines by which Member States had to switch from
FITs to auction mechanism starting from 2017.




3.1 Critique of supporting policies in literature
German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) is widely considered as a very
successful tool for increasing share of RES in electricity consumption. Nonethe-
less, this has come with excessive costs for end customers. German household
electricity prices went up from 14 EURcent/kWh in 2000 to 29 EURcent/kWh
in 2013, see Figure 3.1 for more details about the development of prices for
households.
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Among RES technologies, only large hydropower stations are not dependent
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on support, which is provided by EEG (Frondel et al., 2009), since hydropower
is a very mature technology. End customers through so-called EEG levy pay
all additional costs associated with subsidies. In 2000, EEG levy was 0.19
EURcent/kWh and increased to the level of 6.24 EURcent/kWh in 2014. See
Figure 3.2 for more details about the price structure of German households.
The overall cost of EEG subsidies increased drastically during 2009 – 2014,
from about EUR 5 billion in 2009 to some EUR 25 billion in 2014. (Poser et
al., 2014).
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Price structure for Czech households is different. As it can be seen from Fig-
ure 3.3, taxes and levies account for moreless same portion since 2008. In fact,
it slightly increased from 2.21 EURcent/kWh in 2009 to 2.36 EURcent/kWh
in 2015, growth of only 6.8%. Whereas in Germany for the period from 2009
to 20141 growth was 64%. However, the surcharge for support of RES went up
from 6.7 EUR/MWh in 2010 to 19.8 EUR/MWh in 2014. The development of
price structure of Czech households is depicted in Figure 3.3.
From 2001 until 2008, amount of feed-in tariffs in Germany went up from
some EUR 1.6 billion to EUR 9 billion. With such large amounts of subsidies,
only 211.1 million euros were allocated to R&D in renewable energies by gov-
ernment, this accounts for 3% of the total expenses related to FITs (Frondel
et al., 2009). Nonetheless, these support schemes have been very successful in
1no data for 2015
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aspect of increasing installed capacities of RES. In Germany, photovoltaics, the
recipient of highest FITs, increased its capacity from 100 MW in 2000 to 5311
MW in 2008. In the Czech Republic, installed capacity of PV between 2008
and 2010 soared from 39.5 MW to 1959.1 MW. In addition, Prusa et al. (2013)
calculated that in 2011 average usage of Czech PV plants was only 1099 hours
(12.54% of the total number of hours in the year) and the total cost of PV
subsidies was about EUR 972 million and EUR 216 million out of this amount
is ”the pure dead weight loss”. Prusa et al. (2013) define the pure DWL as
follows:
The pure DWL component is a net loss to the economy, because it captures
the extent of inefficient electricity production. p02 [the pure DWL - author’s
note] is equivalent to an artificial cost which would not exist were it not for
the subsidies. This cost appears because money is invested in PV production
capacity that is more expensive than other feasible sources.
Feed-in tariffs are usually granted for 20 years, this is a good feature for
investors, since they can be assured in long-term support. So even if they would
be abolished this year, additional costs will still be paid for 19 years by end
customers, if no retrospective legislation will be put in force. While, putting
retrospective laws in force is a very bad signal for investors, since they cannot be
confident with safety of their investments. In 2010, Czech Republic introduced
retroactive legislation in the form of a withholding tax of 26% for photovoltaics
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with installed capacity of over 30 kW valid for 2011 – 2013. Furthermore, Czech
government cancelled previously guaranteed tax-free period of first five years
of a project life. The impact was instantaneous, annual installed capacities of
PV plummeted from 1494.5 MW in 2010 to 11.9 MW in 2011, 99.2% decrease
in just one year. Average annual installed capacities for the period 2011 – 2014
is 27.075 MW, furthermore, in 2014 there was even negative installed capacity,
i.e. dismantling of some2 PV stations. Moreover, such legislative action of the
Czech government also indirectly impacted wind sector, in 2011 only 1.1 MW
of wind capacity were installed, whereas in 2010 24.6 MW of wind capacity
were installed, 95.5% decrease in just one year. Hydropower also was affected,
in 2011 1.5 MW of hydropower capacity were dismantled, while in 2010 19.6
MW of hydropower capacity were installed, i.e. more than 100% decrease. Of
course we cannot claim, that PV, wind and hydropower sectors declines were
caused solely by the Czech legislative action. For instance, additional reason
for PV sector decline is a stoppage of connections into the grid for new PV
plants in 2010, this problem is more explained in section 3.1.1. Nevertheless,
we see that a large drop in installed capacities occurred next year after Czech
government introduced such an unpopular legislation.
In Germany, FITs for wind farms put in operation in 2003 are expected to
be lower than prices for electricity in 2022 (Frondel et al., 2009). Therefore, it
will take 19 years for wind farms to be competitive without subsidies. It should
be mentioned that onshore wind is considered as moreless mature technology.
Furthermore, technology specific feed-in tariffs reduce competition within
RES. If FITs would have been same for all types of RES, we would not be
able to claim that PV installations would had resulted in same capacities as
now. Though in Germany, installations of PV plant capacities exceed that ones
of biomass, biomass has generated much more energy than solar PV plants.
So if subsidies would be the same, it probably would be more economically
reasonable to invest into biomass sector rather than into PV sector. Prusa et
al. (2013) found out that in the Czech Republic, for PV plants to be non-loss
making either prices have to go up seven times or costs have to be reduced
seven times.
Whilst prices for end customers increased, wholesale prices have decreased.
In Germany, base load prices plummeted from 90-95 EUR/MWh in 2008 to 37
EUR/MWh in 2013. This created financial problems for utilities that operated
thermal power plants. German utilities companies stocks went down by almost
265 MW
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45 percent from 2010 to 2014 and credit ratings are lowered for them from A
to A- or in case of RWE even to BBB+ (Poser et al., 2014).
Frondel et al. (2010) suggest instead of excessive subsidies for RES to invest
more in R&D. Now producers of RES-E are induced to be more cost efficient
via degressive rates of FITs.
Likewise, Menanteau et al. (2003) suggest introduction of ”optimum envi-
ronmental tax”. So consumers would be induced to choose between efficient
use of energy from conventional resources or use energy from RES without such
tax. So if the cost of pollution and other environmental damage from conven-
tional production of energy can be properly estimated such Pigovian tax can
be introduced. This would correct the market imperfections (Menanteau et al.,
2003). We know similar tax as tax on CO2 emissions.
3.1.1 Problems of integrating renewable energy into the grid
One more problem of renewables is grid connection. Producers of RES-E are
entitled to have a priority access into the grid. But locations of some plants
are far away from the grid, for instance offshore wind farms in Germany. So
expansion of transmission grids needs large investments. Investment costs for
Germany are estimated to be approximately EUR 40 billion (Poser et al., 2014)
over the decade. There is the ”Grid Development Plan” in Germany, which
encompasses development of infrastructure and connection of north offshore
wind plants with southern regions. In 2012, energy transition induced four
German TSOs to spend EUR 1.15 billion on network infrastructure.
In the Czech Republic, the most favourable locations for wind farms are
along the German and Polish borders, as well as Slovakian border and also
in the Moravian highlands. Accordingly, they are remote from the biggest
consumption centers such as Prague, Ostrava and Brno. Until 2023, Czech
TSO is going to invest into expansion of the grid CZK 60-70 billion3 (EUR 2.2
- 2.59 billion; exchange rate is 27) this is the biggest investment in the history4
of the country. However, this expansion is planned not only due to increasing
installed capacities of RES but mainly because of increasing capacity of nuclear
power. In contrast with Germany, Czech Republic is not planning to abandon
nuclear power.
In the Czech Republic, in February 2010 due to technical reasons Czech
3Jirous et al., 2011
4as of 2011.
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TSO requested stoppage of connections into the grid for new PV plants. Czech
TSO stated that excessive amount of new PV plants can threaten security of
the grid.
For grid operators there are also so-called grid balancing costs. Such costs
arise due to intermittent character of some types of RES. Wind and solar
technologies are dependent on weather, so when there is no wind wind farms
do not generate electricity and when there is a cloudy sky PV plants do not
generate electricity. Thus, grid operators must balance out electricity capacities
in the grid in order to prevent stoppages of electricity supply and security of
the grid. Next section discusses intermittency problem more detailed.
3.1.2 Intermittent character of renewable energy
Many proponents of RES say that RES will decrease dependency from depleting
fossil fuels. However, RES tend to have intermittent character. For example,
onshore wind farm with installed capacity of 100 MW will produce only 20-35%5
of electricity that it would have produced if suitable weather conditions were
holding all the year round – this is known as the capacity factor. For solar PV
plants, the capacity factor is between 10-20%6.In order to save customers from
blackouts backup energy systems must be in place. In Germany, on January
5, 2012 solar and wind combined production was 500 GWh, maximum for that
year; and minimum was on December 19, 2012 with combined production of
only 30 GWh. Therefore, large backup capacities of thermal power plants must
be in place (Poser et al., 2014).
There are different ways to tackle the problem of intermittency, the major
ones are:
• Use of fossil fuels, so at times when RES-E producers are unable to meet
the demand, conventional plants start to produce electricity. Maintenance
of such systems is costly. For Germany, amount of EUR 590 million
in 2006 was calculated by Erdmann (2008). The use of fossil fuels is
relatively easy and cheap only in case of long-term balancing (i.e. days
or week notice).
• Transmission of surplus from one location to another, this requires good
interconnection between locations. This goes back to the development of
5FS-UNEP, 2016
6See prev. note
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the grid and also may require good collaboration between the states. In
addition, it will increase the grid balancing costs.
• Demand response, so when RES expected to produce low volume of elec-
tricity, large industrial and commercial customers are paid by the grid
operator to lower their consumption of electricity by switching off ma-
chines and/or air conditioning etc. The amount of payment must be
properly calculated, nevertheless this method is costly and difficult to
implement. This method is relatively easy to implement in medium-term
notice (i.e. hours).
• Energy storage, surplus of produced RES-E is stored and when RES-E
producer cannot meet the demand stored electricity is fed into the grid.
Probably the best option in short notice (i.e. seconds to minutes).
The latter option is promising because prices for batteries have been falling.
For example, prices of electric vehicle batteries are steadily decreasing. The
average cost per kWh fell from some 1000 $ in 2010 (EUR 757.57, exchange
rate is 1.32, which is average monthly rate for 2010) to some 390 $7 in 2015
(EUR 354.55, exchange rate is 1.10, which is average monthly rate for 2010).
The decrease is caused by technological improvements as well as economies of
scale. This is also driven by increasing demand for electric vehicles. There are
two types of storage: so-called ”behind the meter” and the grid-scale storage.
Behind the meter storages are located inside the buildings and reserved for
self use. Germany has a subsidy programme for small-scale PV installations
with storage effective from 2013. By the end of September 2015, 27 000 storage
systems were sold with capacity of 136 MWh8.
Grid-scale battery storages are of much larger capacities and located close
to wind farms or solar plants. For instance, in Germany 5 MWh storage system
was put in operation for utility which operates a large share of wind energy. In
2015, worldwide 1220 MW9 of grid-scale projects were announced.
Nonetheless, the storage systems increase the costs of RES-E. In 2015, Ger-
man levelised cost of electricity for onshore wind farm with storage of 50% of
total installed capacity is 120 $/MWh10 (EUR 109.09, exchange rate is 1.10),
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is 198 $/MWh11 (EUR 180, exchange rate is 1.10), which is 85% higher than
without storage. Consequently, we see that storage systems increase the costs
substantially, yet these costs tend to decrease, since prices for batteries decrease
and overall development of storage technology is promising.
In addition, wholesale prices have become dependent on weather conditions.
Wholesale prices go down when the sun shines and the wind is strong and go
up when no wind and no sun but high demand for power remains. Therefore,
price forecasts for futures have become more subtle and complicated.
3.1.3 Reduced CO2 emissions
Prices of CO2 emission certificates, which are traded on European Emissions
Trading System (ETS), have never been above 30 EUR/tonne of CO2. In 2008,
calculated cost of abatement one tonne of CO2 emission by PV in Germany was
716 euros and by wind energy was 54 euros (Frondel et al., 2009). Therefore,
from economic point of view it is much more beneficial to buy certificates than
subsidize renewable energies.
Nevertheless, in 2009, about 340 million metric tonnes of CO2 emissions
were saved by the use of RES in EU. Taking the price of 15 EUR/tonne of
CO2 in 2009, savings will result in EUR 51 billion for 2009 year alone (Poser
et al., 2014).
In order to see correlation between change in RES share in gross final energy
consumption and greenhouse gas (hereinafter GHG) abatement for Germany
we will run the following regressions12
GHGE = β0 + β1RESE
GHGHC = β0 + β1RESHC
GHGT = β0 + β1REST
where, GHGE = GHGEt − GHGEt−1, i.e. yearly change in amount of GHG
abatement induced by change in RES-E share in gross final electricity con-
sumption; and RESE = RESEt − RESEt−1, i.e. yearly change of RES-E
share in gross final electricity consumption. Analogously, other two regressions
should be read. Likewise, all three regressions were tested for heteroskedas-
11See prev. note
12Stata outputs for all regressions can be found in Appendix A.
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ticity (hettest), normality (swilk) and specification test for omitted variables
(ovtest) results can be found in Appendix A in notes under the relevant table.
No regressions were run for the Czech Republic due to lack of data.
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Figure 3.4 is a scatter plot for all three regressions. Y-axis is measured in
tonnes of CO2 equivalent and X-axis is measured in percentage points. Re-
gression of GHG abatement by RES-E resulted in R-squared of 0.5653, i.e.
56.53% of variability in dependent variable is explained by the independent






Coefficient is statistically significant even at 1% significance level. Thus, one
percent increase of RES-E share in gross final electricity consumption results in
abatement of 3609.046 tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Constant in this regression
is statistically insignificant.
Regression of GHG abatement by RES-H/C has R-squared of 0.5113. Equa-






Constant is statistically insignificant, whereas coefficient is statistically signif-
icant even at 1% significance level. Therefore, when RES-H/C share in final
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energy consumption in heating and cooling is increased by 1%, GHG abatement
increases by 3132.254 tonnes of CO2 equivalent.
Regression of GHG abatement by RES-T has R-squared of 0.9851, which is






Here constant is also statistically insignificant and coefficient is statistically
significant even 1% significance level. Thus, 1% increase in RES-T share energy
consumption in transport increases GHG abatement by 951.239 tonnes of CO2
equivalent.
Having these results and estimations of RES shares from Table 2.2 we can
estimate the amount of GHG abatement in 2020 by multiplication of relevant
coefficients with estimated shares of relevant RES. Thereby, we have the fol-
lowing estimations:
RES − E2020xcoef.RESE = 139309.2
RES −H/C2020xcoef.RESHC = 48549.94
RES − T2020xcoef.REST = 12556.37
All estimations are measured in tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Thus, we have
that in 2020 year alone total estimated GHG abatement is 200 415.5 thousand
tonnes of CO2 equivalent, according to German NREAP 215 million tonnes of
CO2 equivalent will be prevented by 2020, thus there is less than 7% discrep-
ancy between my estimations and German NREAP estimations. Taking into
account that prices of certificates on ETS should increase, savings in money
equivalent will be significant. If we take current price13 of EU Emission Al-
lowance – 6.05 EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalent, we can estimate that savings
in 2020 year alone will be 1.213 billion EUR. However, these estimation is as-
suming that prices will remain at its current level, whereas they must go up,
since the number of the certificates will gradually go down. This estimation is
conducted in order to show you the size effect of GHG abatement.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of dependence between
installed capacity and feed-in tariffs
4.1 Model description
We are going to analyse dependence between feed-in tariffs and installed ca-
pacity of each type of RES-E in Germany and the Czech Republic via linear
regression. Firstly, we will use simple linear regression, our dependent variable
will be installed capacity in year t, MWt, and independent variable will be FIT
in year t, FITt. Thus, the equation will be:
MWt = β0 + β1FITt
Then for some types of RES we will add polynomial of second order and
in two cases polynomial of third order, in case of Czech solar RES we will add
a polynomial of fourth order and a dummy, reasoning will be explained later.
Therefore the equations will be:
MWt = β0 + β1FIT
2
t + β2FITt











t + β4FITt + β5D
All successful regressions (i.e. p-value of F-test is lower than 0.05 or in some
cases lower than 0.1) were tested for heteroskedasticity (hettest), normality
(swilk) and specification test for omitted variables (ovtest) results can be found
in Appendix A in notes under the relevant table.
For Germany data will be taken between years 2000 and 2015. However, if
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value of FITt for some t is zero, then this year is omitted. There are such cases
in landfill, sewage and mine gas RES, where FITs were introduced in 2004,
in geothermal RES, where FITs were introduced also in 2004, and in offshore
wind RES, where FITs were introduced in 2009. The data for Germany is
taken from Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. It should be
mentioned that each technology-specific average FIT for a given year will be
used as FITt.
For the Czech Republic data will be taken for 2002 – 2015 period. No
restrictions on value of FITt are imposed. Nevertheless, for the Czech Republic
we managed to collect much less data than for Germany. We could not find
data about installations of biomass and biogas1 RES. The data for the Czech
Republic is taken from the Energy Regulatory Office.
4.2 Outcomes of the model
Regression for German hydropower resulted in statistically insignificant coef-
ficient of FIT , p-value of the coefficient is 0.543. In addition, R-squared is
only 0.0271, which means that only 2.71% of variability in dependent variable
is explained by the independent one. Finally, regression itself is insignificant,
since p-value of the F-test is 0.5426. This is caused by the fact that sites for
such RES technology are scarce, since can be located only on rivers. Therefore,
there is no relation between the size of FIT and installation amounts. Average
annual growth rate of installed capacity for the period of 2001 – 2015 is 0.99%.
It should be noted, that hydropower is the most mature type of RES among
all, since it has been developing for decades.
Regression for Czech hydropower also resulted in statistically insignificant
coefficient of FIT , p-value of the coefficient is 0.585. R-squared of the regression
is only 0.0527. This is caused by the same reasons as in German case.
Figure 4.1 is a scatter plot for German landfill, sewage and mine gas RES.
Y-axis is the amount of annual installed capacity of this RES in MW. X-axis






Thus, one cent of FIT corresponds to 643.87 MW of installed capacity. For
1For biogas we managed to find such data for 2006 and 2007, but then in ERO reports
such data is missing.
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instance, if in year t+1 FIT will be increased by one cent, then installed ca-
pacity will be increased by 643.87 MW in comparison to year t. p-value of the
coefficient is 0.0762, i.e. coefficient is statistically significant at 10% significance
level. Likewise, overall significance of the regression is achieved only at 10%
significance level, since p-value of the F-test is 0.0765. In addition, so far max-
imum change of FIT was 0.2 cent, increase in 2011 from 7.2 to 7.4 and decrease
in 2013 from 7.3 to 7.1. R-squared of this equation is 0.2806, i.e. independent
variable explains 28.06% of variability of dependent variable. Though, aver-
age growth rate of FIT between 2005 and 2015 is only 0.14%, average annual
growth rate of installed capacity is 20.97%.
No regression was run for the Czech Republic due to lack of data.
Geothermal type of RES started to develop in Germany in 2007, when the
first 2 MW of this type of RES were installed. Average growth rate of installed
capacity is 55%, nonetheless there were years with no increase at all and years
such as 2012, when 13 MW were added, resulting in 260% increase in compar-
ison to 2011. Regression resulted in statistically insignificant coefficient and
constant, with p-values 0.34 and 0.55 respectively. Moreover, overall regres-
sion is insignificant, p-value of the F-test is 0.3396. This is caused by scarcity
of this type of RES, i.e. special site needed to be found in order to generate
2For full Stata output of all regressions see Appendix A.
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geothermal energy. Therefore, feed-in tariffs do not impact amount of installed
capacity of this type of RES.
No regression was run for the Czech Republic due to lack of data.
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Figure 4.2 is a scatter plot for German onshore wind RES. Y-axis and X-axis






Therefore, one cent of FIT corresponds to 1090 MW of installed capacity. For
instance, if in year t+1 FIT will be increased by one cent, then installed capacity
in year t+1 will be increased by 1090 MW in comparison to year t. R-squared
of this equation is 0.3208, i.e. independent variable explains 32.08% of vari-
ability of dependent variable. p-value of independent variable is 0.022, i.e. it is
statistically significant at 5% significance level, whereas, p-value of constant is
0.069, i.e. it is not statistically significant at 5% significance level, however at
10% significance level it is statistically significant. But, Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity yields that there is a constant variance3. Nevertheless, when
we add in the model a polynomial of the second order, Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroskedasticity rejects null hypothesis, which is constant variance of depen-
dent variable fitted values. Likewise, R-squared increases to the level of 0.5525,
3See Appendix A for p-value of other tests.
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all coefficients and constant are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
The equation of this model – dotted line – is:
M̂W = −2570.459
(991.01)




By calculating the maximum of this parabola we find the optimum FIT for
onshore wind RES, i.e. under this FIT the maximum annual installed capacity
is anticipated. The optimum FIT is 9.65 EURcent/kWh. Therefore, higher
FITs are inefficient, since they result in lower installed capacities at higher
expenses. Likewise, FITs below 8.52 will result in negative installed capacities.
Therefore, FITs should be set inside (8.52;9.65] interval. In addition, average
growth rate of FIT is only 0.40% for the period of 2001 – 2015, average installed
capacity growth rate is 14.16%.
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Figure 4.3 is a scatterplot for Czech wind RES. Y-axis is in MW of in-
stalled capacity and X-axis is a feed-in tariff in CZK/kWh. I have run various
regressions: simple ones, with polynomials of the second, third and even fourth
orders. No regression was successful. It is seen from Figure 4.3 that data is
very dispersed, thus very difficult to draw a line which would approximately
match the pattern. In all regressions, overall p-values were greater than 0.1706.
Thus, we can conclude that wind installations are independent from FITs.
Figure 4.4 is a scatter plot for offshore wind RES in Germany. Y-axis and
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Hence, one cent of FIT corresponds to 438.46 MW of installed capacity. For
instance, if in year t+1 FIT will be increased by one cent, then installed ca-
pacity will be increased by 438.46 MW in comparison to year t. R-squared of
this equation is 0.6019, i.e. independent variable explains 60.19% of variability
of dependent variable. Independent variable is statistically significant at 5%
significance level, p-value of constant is 0.051, i.e. constant is almost statisti-
cally significant at 5% significance level. Yet, Ramsey RESET test concludes
that we have omitted variables4. Accordingly, when we add in the model a
polynomial of second order, R-squared of the model increases to the level of
0.9910, i.e. model explains 99.1% of variability in the dependent variable. In
addition, all coefficients and constant are statistically significant even at 1%
significance level. The equation of the model – dotted line – is:
M̂W = 353.0522
(26.86775)




The minimum corresponds to the point where derivative changes its sign, i.e.
4See Appendix A for p-values of tests.
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negative marginal returns change to increasing marginal returns. The minimum
here is 15.8727, parabola at this point is below zero, i.e. when FIT is set at
15.8727 annual installed capacity will be negative. So producers of RES will
dismantle their wind farms. Actually, parabola is negative when values of FIT
are inside [15.0764;16.6691] interval. Therefore, FITs should not be set inside
this interval. However, such model implies that FIT set at 0 will result in
88725.89 MW of installed capacity, which is barely can make sense. In order
to exclude this shortcoming of the model, we add a polynomial of third order,
and now the model – wide dashed line – is:
M̂W = 9
(24.15052)
9.41284FIT 3 − 4656.334
(1216.998)




All coefficients and constant are statistically significant at 5% significance level.
R-squared increased a little bit to the level of 0.9986. There are two points
where derivative is zero: 15.1436 and 16.082. Inside the interval of these
two values marginal returns are negative. Therefore it is inefficient to set
FITs inside this interval. In addition, FITs set below 14.5612 result in nega-
tive installed capacities. Accordingly, FITs should be set inside the intervals
(14.5612;15.1436] and (16.5519; +∞). We excluded interval (16.082;16.5519)
because FITs set inside [14.6736;15.1436] interval result in same installed ca-
pacities but with lower FITs.
First offshore wind farms in Germany were installed in 2009, with 30 MW.
Ever since, the average annual growth rate of installed capacity is 126%. Off-
shore wind projects are very expensive, since they have excessive initial invest-
ment costs. And the project makes sense only if it is of bigger scale, that is
why we see such big growth rates of installed capacities. This type of RES
showed incredible growth, with only 30 MW installed in 2009, 3283 MW were
installed in 2015 alone. Growth of more than 10 000 % in 6 years.
Figure 4.5 is a scatter plot for biomass RES. Y-axis and X-axis are same as






That is, one cent of FIT corresponds to decrease of 19.16 MW of installed
capacity. For instance, if in year t+1 FIT will be increased by one cent, then
installed capacity will be decreased by 19.16 MW in comparison to year t. Con-
stant and independent variables are statistically significant at 5% significance
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level. R-squared of this equation is 0.4501, i.e. independent variable explains
45.01% of variability of dependent variable. Likewise, when we add a polyno-
mial of second order R-squared increases to the level of 0.6808. Coefficients
remain statistically significant at 5% significance level, but p-value of constant
is 0.075, thus constant is statistically significant only at 10% significance level.
The equation of the model – dotted line – is:
M̂W = −6.027
(1.966)




The maximum of the parabola is the optimum FIT, i.e. maximum annual
installed capacity is achieved under this FIT. The maximum is at 12.5476,
consequently FITs higher than 12.5476 are inefficient, since they will result in
lower installed capacities at higher costs. In addition, FITs set below 6.29957
will result in negative installed capacities. Therefore, FITs should be set inside
(6.29957;12.5476] interval. Average growth rate of FIT between 2001 and 2015
is 5% and average annual growth rate of installed capacity is 16%. Nevertheless,
in recent years the growth slowed down to average of 0.62%5. The boom of
installations of this type of RES was between 2001 and 2006 with average
annual growth rate of 33%.
No regression was run for the Czech Republic due to lack of data.
5Average annual growth rate between 2010 and 2015.
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Figure 4.6 is a scatter plot for solar RES in Germany. Y-axis and X-axis






Constant is statistically significant at 5% significance level and independent
variable is statistically significant only at 10% significance level as well as
whole regression is significant only at 10% significance level. R-squared of this
equation is 0.2219, i.e. independent variable explains 22.19% of variability of
dependent variable. With one cent increase in FIT, installed capacity will de-
crease by 154.9 MW. But, Ramsey RESET test concludes that we have omitted
variables. Thence, we add a polynomial of second order. All coefficients and
constant become statistically significant even at 1% significance level and re-
gression is overall significant even at 1% significance level. R-squared increases







The optimum FIT for this model is where parabola has its maximum. The
maximum is at 40.1963, consequently, FITs higher than 40.1963 are inefficient.
Furthermore, FITs set below 28.3546 result in negative installed capacities.
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Therefore, FITs should be set inside (28.3546;40.1963] interval. Yet, Ramsey
RESET test still concludes that we have omitted variables. Thus, we add
polynomial of third order and Ramsey RESET test does not conclude that we
have omitted variables. It slightly changes our intervals. Likewise, R-squared
increases to the level of 0.8531, all coefficients and constant remain statistically




FIT 3 − 554.4399
(150.8367)




There are two points where derivative is zero: 37.9719 and 53.7514. Inside
the interval of these values marginal returns are negative, thus, it is inefficient
to set FIT between 37.9719 and 53.7514. In addition, FITs set below 29.9764
will result in negative installed capacities. Therefore, FITs should be set inside
the following intervals: (29.9764;37.9719] and (61.6409; +∞). We excluded
interval (53.7514; 61.6409), since values inside [30.0824;37.9719] result in the
same installed capacities but at lower FITs. This is the only type of RES for
which average FIT has been steadily decreasing since 2006, average decrease
rate of 5% between years 2006 and 2015. Nonetheless, average annual installed
capacity growth rate for the same period is 16%, with boom in 2009 with 128%
annual growth rate. Moreover, now there are 3 consecutive years of negative
annual growth rates of installed capacity.
Figure 4.7 is a scatter plot for Czech solar energy. Y-axis and X-axis are
same as in Figure 4.3. As it has already been written, in 2010 Czech government
introduced a retroactive legislation. Therefore, data after 2010 is very biased.
Moreover, in 2010 there was an unexpected boom of photovoltaic installations,
which led to stoppage of connections into the grid for new PV installations.
That is why, I added a dummy variable ”D”, which was equal 1 only for 2010
year and 0 for all others years. Only after adding polynomial of fourth order re-
gression was moreless successful. Ramsey RESET test still concluded that there
is an omitted variable, though at 4% significance level did not. Breusch-Pagan














Constant here is statistically insignificant. Function for FITs has three val-
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ues where derivatives are zero: 1.57; 4.72; 11.026. Inside (1.57;4.72) interval
marginal returns are negative, i.e. it is inefficient to set FITs inside this inter-
val. Inside [4.72;11.026) marginal returns are positive. However, FITs should
be set inside the following intervals: (0;1.57] and (6.64;11.026]. We excluded
[4.72;6.64] interval because FITs set inside [0.1858;1.57] result in same installed
capacities.
Table 4.1: Summary of optimal FITs
Type of RES Interval for optimum FITs
German onshore wind (8.52; 9.65]
German offshore wind (14.56; 15.14] and (16.55; +∞)
German biomass (6.29; 12.55]
German solar (29.98; 37.97] and (61.64; +∞)
Czech solar (0; 1.57] and (6.64; 11.03]*
Note: for Czech solar intervals include shortages explained before.
Table 4.1 summarizes all found optimum intervals for feed-in tariffs. We did
not find optimum intervals for FITs in cases of: hydro RES of both countries,
landfill,sewage and mine gas RES of both countries, Czech wind RES and Czech
biomass. Moreover, optimum interval of FITs for Czech solar includes some
shortages explained before. Therefore, we have optimum intervals for FITs in
5 cases. Thereby, we believe that if feed-in tariff scheme to be continued and
governments want to maximize their installed capacities of RES, they should
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set feed-in tariffs inside these intervals. For Germany, FITs are measured in
euros and for the Czech Republic FITs are measured in Czech korunas.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The main purpose of this thesis was to determine what are the growth oppor-
tunities of renewable energy and how renewable energy is financed in the Czech
Republic and Germany.
After reviewing German and Czech NREAPs we ascertained that support
for renewable energy is mainly covered by end-customers. End-customers of
both countries have additional costs related to support of RES included in their
bills. Additional costs related to RES include: feed-in tariffs and other financial
types of support, grid development costs and grid balancing costs. All these
costs are firstly borne by TSOs and DSOs but then they are passed onto end-
customers. However, not all additional costs are borne by end-customers, in the
Czech Republic, there is a subsidy, which covers the costs of market operators
associated with FITs. In addition, RES producers have some tax benefits.
This support resulted in significant increase of installed capacities in all types
of RES excluding hydro, since it has already been very developed. However,
since feed-in tariff scheme is regarded as a very costly method and moreover,
European Commission has approved the removal of all feed-in tariff schemes
from 2017, Germany has already started to shift towards auction scheme.
In Chapter 4, I analyse the dependence between annual installed capacities
of RES and respective feed-in tariffs. We took the empirical data of annual
installed capacities and regressed it on respective FITs and/or their polynomi-
als. The analysis resulted in optimum intervals for some types of RES, they
are summarised in Table 4.1. We could not collect most of the data for the
Czech Republic, since the Energy Regulatory Office of the Czech Republic
does not publish the time series for RES, unlike Germany, which publishes a
comprehensive database regarding RES.
5. Conclusion 38
Optimum intervals in Table 4.1 indicate at which values of FIT the biggest
amount of installed capacities is anticipated. Thus, if FIT scheme to be contin-
ued after 2017, FITs should be set inside these intervals. This intervals assume
that there are no any caps and restrictions. Nonetheless, there were regressions
which were insignificant, though had data, for instance, hydro RES in Germany
and the Czech Republic. In this case, we conclude that size of FITs do not
really plays a big role in decision making of investors, i.e. investors are more
concerned about other factors rather than about FITs. Likewise, regressions
resulted in insignificant results in case of Czech wind RES.
Therefore, growth opportunities of renewable energy can be predicted by
these intervals and resulting equations of the regressions run.
Likewise, in Chapter 3 various shortcomings related to renewables are dis-
cussed and some ways of how to resolve these shortcomings are provided. In
addition, in section 3.1.3 we estimated relation between GHG abatement and
share of RES.
For the following researchers in the field we would advise to find the miss-
ing data for the Czech Republic and do similar analysis. Likewise, find data
for other factors, which can affect RES investors in their decision making of
whether install capacities of RES or not. For instance, obtain time series for
investment costs and/or levelised cost of RES-E. Since, we believe that these
factors could have been included in the model, but we could not obtain such
data.
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Appendix A
Stata outputs
Table A.1: Stata output for German GHG abatement by RES-E
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 18.21
Model 3.54E+08 1 3.5E+08 Prob >F 0.0008
Residual 2.72E+08 14 1.9E+07 R-squared 0.5653
Adj R-squared 0.5343
Total 6.27E+08 15 4.2E+07 Root MSE 4410.9
GHGEDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
RESEshareDE 3609.046 845.7903 4.27 0.001 1795.007 5423.086
cons -317.18 1820.415 -0.17 0.864 -4221.58 3587.222
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.7104; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.1165;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.0911
Table A.2: Stata output for German GHG abatement by RES-H/C
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 14.65
Model 1.08E+08 1 1.1E+08 Prob >F 0.0018
Residual 1.04E+08 14 7393880 R-squared 0.5113
Adj R-squared 0.4764
Total 2.12E+08 15 1.4E+07 Root MSE 2719.2
GHGHCDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
RESHCshareDE 3132.254 818.3969 3.83 0.002 1376.967 4887.541
cons -290.566 818.1411 -0.36 0.728 -2045.3 1464.172
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.1388; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.5004;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.92334
A. Stata outputs II
Table A.3: Stata output for German GHG abatement by RES-H/C
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 923.55
Model 13027681 1 1.3E+07 Prob >F 0
Residual 197484.9 14 14106.1 R-squared 0.9851
Adj R-squared 0.984
Total 13225166 15 881678 Root MSE 118.77
GHGTDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
RESTshareDE 951.2398 31.30108 30.39 0 884.1057 1018.374
cons -6.63744 31.26193 -0.21 0.835 -73.6876 60.41274
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.3923; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.9475;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.13027
Table A.4: Stata output of German regression for hydro RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 0.39
Model 4526.865 1 4526.865 Prob >F 0.5426
Residual 162676.1 14 11619.72 R-squared 0.0271
Adj R-squared -0.0424
Total 167202.9 15 11146.86 Root MSE 107.79
MWHydroDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITHydroDE -18.1088 29.01279 -0.62 0.543 -80.33507 44.11741
cons 211.4045 236.0032 0.90 0.386 -294.7721 717.5811
Note: no tests were done, since regression is insignificant.
Table A.5: Stata output of Czech regression for hydro RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 8
F( 1, 6) 0.33
Model 41.81111 1 41.81111 Prob >F 0.5845
Residual 751.9777 6 125.3296 R-squared 0.0527
Adj R-squared -0.1052
Total 793.7888 7 113.3984 Root MSE 11.195
MWhydroCZ Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FIThydroCZ 7.676342 13.29032 0.58 0.585 -24.84389 40.19658
cons -15.9082 38.97599 -0.41 0.697 -111.279 79.46259
Note: no tests were done, since regression is insignificant.
A. Stata outputs III
Table A.6: Stata output of German regression for landfill, sewage and
mine gas RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 12
F( 1, 10) 3.9
Model 85677.72 1 85677.72 Prob >F 0.0765
Residual 219624 10 21962.4 R-squared 0.2806
Adj R-squared 0.2087
Total 305301.7 11 27754.7 Root MSE 148.2
MWlandfillDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITlandfil∼E 643.8705 325.9901 1.98 0.076 -82.48075 1370.222
cons -4239.11 2325.79 -1.82 0.098 -9421.292 943.0728
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.6085; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.8844;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.18622
Table A.7: Stata output of German regression for geothermal RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 12
F( 1, 10) 1.01
Model 15.53274 1 15.53274 Prob >F 0.3396
Residual 154.4673 10 15.44673 R-squared 0.0914
Adj R-squared 0.0005
Total 170 11 15.45455 Root MSE 3.9302
MWgeoDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITgeoDE 0.282413 .2816304 1.00 0.34 -0.3450982 0.909925
cons -3.40822 5.511267 -0.62 0.55 -15.68808 8.871653
Note: no tests were done, since regression is insignificant.
Table A.8: Stata output of German regression for onshore wind RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 6.61
Model 3314183 1 3314183 Prob >F 0.0222
Residual 7015292 14 501092.3 R-squared 0.3208
Adj R-squared 0.2723
Total 10329475 15 688631.7 Root MSE 707.88
MWonshoreDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITonshoreDE 1090.021 423.8435 2.57 0.022 180.9671 1999.075
cons -7703.76 3906.02 -1.97 0.069 -16081.33 673.8246
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0522; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.0080;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.67288
A. Stata outputs IV
Table A.9: Stata output of German regression for onshore wind RES
with polynomial of 2nd order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 2, 13) 8.02
Model 5706569 2 2853284 Prob >F 0.0054
Residual 4622906 13 355608.2 R-squared 0.5525
Adj R-squared 0.4836
Total 10329475 15 688631.7 Root MSE 596.33
MWonshoreDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITonshoreDE 49620.89 18714.03 2.65 0.02 9191.685 90050.1
FITonshore∼q -2570.46 991.0165 -2.59 0.022 -4711.42 -429.498
cons -236184 88149.72 -2.68 0.019 -426620 -45747.7
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.2548; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.0984;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.80035
Table A.10: Stata output of German regression for offshore wind RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 7
F( 1, 5) 7.56
Model 2325630 1 2325630 Prob >F 0.0403
Residual 1538064 5 307612.9 R-squared 0.6019
Adj R-squared 0.5223
Total 3863694 6 643949 Root MSE 554.63
MWoffshoreDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FIToffshor∼E 438.4589 159.4633 2.75 0.04 28.54531 848.3724
cons -6702.93 2616.775 -2.56 0.051 -13429.57 23.69948
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0027; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.0994;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.29774
Table A.11: Stata output of German regression for offshore wind RES
with polynomial of 2nd order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 7
F( 2, 4) 219.9
Model 3828870 2 1914435 Prob >F 0.0001
Residual 34823.56 4 8705.889 R-squared 0.991
Adj R-squared 0.9865
Total 3863694 6 643949 Root MSE 93.305
MWoffshoreDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FIToffshor∼E -11207.8 886.7051 -12.64 0 -13669.7 -8745.96
FIToffshor∼q 353.0522 26.86775 13.14 0 278.4554 427.649
cons 88725.89 7275.592 12.20 0 68525.61 108926.2
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.1291; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.5067;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.37329
A. Stata outputs V
Table A.12: Stata output of German regression for offshore wind RES
with polynomial of 3rd order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 7
F( 3, 3) 736.62
Model 3858456 3 1286152 Prob >F 0.0001
Residual 5238.035 3 1746.012 R-squared 0.9986
Adj R-squared 0.9973
Total 3863694 6 643949 Root MSE 41.785
MWoffshoreDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FIToffshor∼E 72632.58 20371.35 3.57 0.038 7801.834 137463.3
FIToffshor∼q -4656.33 1216.998 -3.83 0.031 -8529.36 -783.305
FIToffshor∼u 99.41284 24.15052 4.12 0.026 22.55512 176.2706
cons -377268 113251.5 -3.33 0.045 -737685 -16851.2
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.5667; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.5080;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.65274
Table A.13: Stata output of German regression for biomass RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 11.46
Model 89203.11 1 89203.11 Prob >F 0.0044
Residual 108981.9 14 7784.421 R-squared 0.4501
Adj R-squared 0.4108
Total 198185 15 13212.33 Root MSE 88.229
MWbiomassDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITbiomassDE -19.1608 5.660266 -3.39 0.004 -31.30086 -7.02074
cons 399.4383 82.66532 4.83 0 222.1388 576.7378
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0544; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.1122;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.61289
Table A.14: Stata output of German regression for biomass RES with
polynomial of 2nd order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 2, 13) 13.86
Model 134919.1 2 67459.55 Prob >F 0.0006
Residual 63265.91 13 4866.608 R-squared 0.6808
Adj R-squared 0.6317
Total 198185 15 13212.33 Root MSE 69.761
MWbiomassDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITbiomassDE 151.2494 55.77982 2.71 0.018 30.74439 271.7543
FITbiomass∼q -6.02677 1.966364 -3.06 0.009 -10.2748 -1.7787
cons -713.627 368.9966 -1.93 0.075 -1510.8 83.54147
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.6864; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.3743;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.19820
A. Stata outputs VI
Table A.15: Stata output of German regression for solar RES
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 1, 14) 3.99
Model 25337064 1 25337064 Prob >F 0.0655
Residual 88859997 14 6347143 R-squared 0.2219
Adj R-squared 0.1663
Total 1.14E+08 15 7613137 Root MSE 2519.4
MWpvDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITPVDE -154.907 77.53224 -2.00 0.066 -321.1972 11.38301
cons 9441.761 3542.484 2.67 0.018 1843.888 17039.63
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0000; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.0711;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.05059
Table A.16: Stata output of German regression for solar RES with
polynomial of 2nd order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 2, 13) 16.29
Model 81632652 2 40816326 Prob >F 0.0003
Residual 32564409 13 2504955 R-squared 0.7148
Adj R-squared 0.671
Total 1.14E+08 15 7613137 Root MSE 1582.7
MWpvDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITPVDE 3863.828 849.1176 4.55 0.001 2029.421 5698.235
FITpvDEsq -48.0617 10.13821 -4.74 0 -69.9639 -26.1594
cons -70916.2 17096.32 -4.15 0.001 -107851 -33981.9
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0005; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.5904;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.61751
Table A.17: Stata output of German regression for solar RES with
polynomial of 3rd order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 16
F( 3, 12) 23.23
Model 97424828 3 32474943 Prob >F 0
Residual 16772233 12 1397686 R-squared 0.8531
Adj R-squared 0.8164
Total 1.14E+08 15 7613137 Root MSE 1182.2
MWpvDE Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITPVDE 24675.01 6223.685 3.96 0.002 11114.76 38235.25
FITpvDEsq -554.44 150.8367 -3.68 0.003 -883.085 -225.795
FITpvDEcu 4.029787 1.198853 3.36 0.006 1.417711 6.641863
cons -350005 84004.61 -4.17 0.001 -533035 -166974
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0611; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.8394;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.56411
A. Stata outputs VII
Table A.18: Stata output of Czech regression for solar RES with poly-
nomial of 4th order
Source SS df MS Number of obs 13
F( 5, 7) 74.82
Model 2067825 5 413565.1 Prob >F 0
Residual 38692.84 7 5527.548 R-squared 0.9816
Adj R-squared 0.9685
Total 2106518 12 175543.2 Root MSE 74.347
MWpvCZ Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
FITpvCZqu -0.69811 .1704983 -4.09 0.005 -1.101274 -0.29495
FITpvCZcu 16.12037 4.297576 3.75 0.007 5.958221 26.28252
FITpvCZsq -107.27 35.03922 -3.06 0.018 -190.1249 -24.4157
FITpvCZ 228.8294 101.4919 2.25 0.059 -11.16089 468.8196
CZdummy 913.9999 137.9842 6.62 0 587.7191 1240.281
cons -64.4934 74.32014 -0.87 0.414 -240.2327 111.2458
Note: ovtest Prob >F = 0.0412; hettest Prob >chi2 = 0.8321;
swilk Prob >Z = 0.06579
